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LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
MAURICE E. STUCKE*

The character Howard Beale's tirade in the 1976 movie Network still
resonates today.' People are angry about the financial crisis, corporate
scandals, and executives' spendthrift ways. 2 In a 2008 survey of "who's to
blame for the economy," 90 percent identified mortgage companies as
having a major effect on the financial crisis. Many also blamed lending
institutions (88 percent), the federal government (86 percent), oil companies (81 percent), and credit card companies (76 percent). 3 Public
respect for business leaders in one March 2009 survey was "all but non4
existent."
Besides anger there is a loss of trust. More than 75 percent of Americans in one survey had lost faith in business between 2008 and 2009.1
* Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law; Senior Fellow, American Antitrust Institute. The author wishes to thank Marina Lao for her comments and for
organizing the ABA and AALS conferences and the other panelists, Darren Bush, Dan
Crane, Keith Hylton, and Howard Shelanski, for their discussion and comments.
I NETwoRK (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1976). For a clip of his "I'm as mad as hell, and I'm
not going to take this anymore" speech, see American Rhetoric: Movie Speech "Network"
(1976), http://www.americanrhetoric.com/MovieSpeeches/moviespeechnetwork2.html.
2 In one survey, feelings of anger over the financial crisis were more prevalent among
college graduates (63 percent felt anger) and upper-income households (annual incomes
of $60,000 or more) (62 percent) than non-graduates (50 percent) and those who did not
attend college (43 percent). The survey was conducted September 30, 2008, the night
after the U.S. House of Representatives rejected a proposed $700 billion bailout plan in
response to the financial crisis. Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority of Americans Angry About Financial
Crisis, Most Expect Their Own Finances to Be Harmed in the Long Term, GALLUP.COM (Oct. 2,
2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/110914/Majority-Americans-Angry-About-FinancialCrisis.aspx.
3 Snapshots, USA TODAY, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.issans.com/News.aspx?newsld=03.
4 Richard Milne, How Business Turned into the Bogeyman, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2009, at 6.
5 2009 Edelman Trust Barometer Executive Summary 1 (10th ed. 2009) [hereinafter
2009 Edelman Summary], http://www.edelman.com/trust/2009/docs/TrustBarometer
_Executive_Summary_FINAL.pdf. More broadly, 62 percent of the 4500 surveyed "opinion leaders" across twenty countries said they trusted companies less in 2009 than in 2008.
Id.; see also Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Davos Confronted by Peak of Distrust, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
27, 2009, at 14. Trust in businesses increased in the 2010 survey. 2010 Edelman Trust
Barometer Executive Summary 1 (11th ed. 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Edelman Summary],
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Few Americans in 2009 trusted corporations.6 Fewer in 2010 trusted the
banking sector.7 Trust in markets deteriorated as evidence of Ponzi
schemes and other financial deceptions emerged, and the government
regulators' failure to deter them.
This past decade had several failures: failure of government institutions,' the intellectual failure of laissez-faire beliefs in self-correcting
markets,9 and moral failures underlying the financial crisis. 10 Despite
some alarmists' concerns, there is little risk that the United States will
become a collectivist, centrally planned economy. But the regulatory,
intellectual, and moral failures that culminated in the financial crisis
http://www.edelman.com/trust/2010/docs/201OTrust_Barometer_Executive_Sum
mary.pdf.
6 2009 Edelman Summary, supra note 5, at 1 (only 38 percent, which was down twenty
percentage points from 2008 and the lowest since the poll began); see also How Trust Has
Eroded, HARV. Bus. REv., June 2009, at 64-65 (76 percent of readers surveyed have less
trust since 2008 in senior management of U.S. companies; only 51 percent of readers had
less trust in management of non-U.S. companies).
7 2010 Edelman Summary, supra note 5, at 4 (only 29 percent of surveyed Americans
in 2010 trusted the banking industry to do what is right). This is a decline of seven percentage points from the 2009 survey. See 2009 Edelman Summary, supra note 5, at 2 (36
percent, down from 69 percent in 2008).
8 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 113, 134-35, 235 (2009) (criticizing the Bush administration's
laissez-faire attitudes); PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE
CIsIs OF 2008 at 162-64 (2009) (same). Other notable failures in the last decade involved national security (e.g., the Bush administration's mishandling of intelligence
before 9/11, its arguments about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq) and environmental catastrophes (e.g., the administration's response to Hurricane Katrina). The decade
began with regulatory failures-with Enron's and WorldCom's fraud, bankruptcies, and
prison sentences for its executives-and ended with the financial crisis.
9 See, e.g., JUSTIN Fox, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009); GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERTJ. SHILLER,
ANIMAL SPIRITS: How

HUMA.N

PSYCHOLOGY DRrvEs

THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT

MATTERS

(2009); John Cassidy, Letter from Chicago: After the Blowup, NEW
YORER,Jan. 11, 2010, at 28; Kenneth M. Davidson, Reality Be Damned: The Legacy of Chicago
School Economics, AM. INTEREST, Nov.-Dec. 2009, http://www.the-american-interest.com/
article-bd.cfm?piece=693; Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong.," N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2009, at 37 (noting that more important than the economists' failure to predict
was "the profession's blindness to the very possibility of catastrophic failures in the market
economy").
1oSee, e.g., ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: THE RETURN'OF THE MASTER 24 (2009) (inquiring
whether the financial crisis was "part of a wider intellectual and regulatory failure, as well
as a moral climate which celebrated moneymaking above all other activities"); Angel Gurria, Sec'y-Gen., OECD, Business Ethics and OECD Principles: What Can Be Done to Avoid
Another Crisis?, Remarks Before the European Business Ethics Forum (Jan. 22, 2009)
(noting that financial crisis "was created by the system itself; by the system which we created; and by a toxic combination of unethical behavior by companies and a faulty regulation and supervision of their activities"), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/3/
0,3343,en_2649201185_4203321911ll,00.html; Milne, supra note 4, at 6 (noting
that over 60 percent of surveyed U.S. residents-as well as residents of five European
countries-described business leaders' behavior as unethical).
FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM
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have prompted antitrust lawyers and economists to reconsider fundamental questions, such as (1) what is competition?; (2) what are the
goals of competition law?; and (3) what should be the legal standards to
promote such goals?"'
In this essay I comment on the Symposium articles by Howard Shelanski, 12 Keith Hylton and Haizhen Lin,"5 and Darren Bush, 14 which raise
important antitrust policy issues in the financial crisis' aftermath.
I. RELEVANCY OF ANTITRUST TODAY
Professor Shelanski's Enforcing Competition During an Economic Crisis
nicely illustrates the unhappy history of antitrust enforcement in past
crises (the panics of 1893 and 1907 and the Great Depression) and addresses the need to be mindful of the longer-term, competitive effects of
consolidation. Although many factors are blamed for the recent financial crisis, vigorous antitrust enforcement is hardly among them. Few
within the antitrust community likely would disagree with Shelanski's
contentions that: (1) antitrust forbearance in past crises was generally
unnecessary or counterproductive to economic recovery; (2) antitrust
review can be swiftly accomplished during an economic crisis (even for
monopolization claims15); and (3) given the cost of more enduring but
less salient harms to competition, innovation, and social welfare from
non-enforcement of the competition laws, antitrust cannot be viewed as
a luxury to be shed during economic hard times.

" For example, the Academic Society for Competition Law (ASCOLA) addressed these
issues at its 2010 annual conference in Bonn, Germany, http://www.ascola.org/Tagungs
programme/Bonn%20_FinalProgram.pdf. See also REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON THE
MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS (Joseph E. Stiglitz &
Amartya Sen, Chairs; Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Coordinator of the Commission 2009) (addressing sustainability and alternative measures of well-being), available at http://www.stiglitzsen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport-anglais.pdf; Rana Foroohar, May the Best Theory Win:
How Economists Are Competing to Make Sense of Our FailedFinancialSystem, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1,
2010, at 42 (discussing annual meeting of American Economic Association).
12 Howard A. Shelanski, Enforcing Competition During an Economic Crisis, supra this issue,
77 ANTITRUST L.J. 229 (2010).
13 Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition,
and ChangingEconomic Conditions, supra this issue, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 247 (2010).
14Darren Bush, Too Big to Bail: The Role of Antitrust in Distressed Industries, supra this
issue, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 277 (2010).
15Complaint, Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf [hereinafter Intel Complaint]. The
administrative proceeding was set for September 15, 2010, nine months after the complaint was filed, and the FTC had expected a Commission decision by August 2011, within
twenty months of the filing of the complaint. In August 2010, Intel settled with the FTC.
See Decision and Order, Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 (Aug. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/100804inteldo.pdf.
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Shelanski encourages enforcers and courts to look beyond the
merger's short-term impact on static price or output competition and to
consider a merger's long-run effects on dynamic competition-namely,
a firm's incentive and ability to invest in innovation. To capture fully the
long-run merger effects, Shelanski argues, the welfare calculation must
account for a broader range of dynamic effects, which can be positive or
negative. A monopolist's impact on innovation can far outweigh any
deadweight losses or static pricing effects.
But there is an important trade-off that Professor Shelanski does not
address-namely, the issue of systemic risk posed by mergers generally
and those in the financial services industries specifically.
No one questions that the financial services industries play a significant role in the U.S. economy. Their contribution to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) has increased over the past sixty years, overtaking
manufacturing. 16 The manufacturing industries' contribution to overall
GDP as a percentage steadily and annually declined-from 25.6 percent
of GDP in 1947 to 17.4 percent in 1987, 15.1 percent in 1998, and 11
percent in 2009. In contrast, the finance, insurance, real estate, rental,
and leasing industries' contribution to overall GDP increased-from
10.4 percent of GDP in 1947, to 17.9 percent in 1987, 19.3 percent in
1998, and 21.4 percent in 2009.17 The U.S. economy, some fear, is "moving, or so it seems, to a world where we're no longer making anything in
this country; we're merely trading pieces of paper, swapping stocks and
bonds back and forth with one another, and paying our financial crou8s
piers a veritable fortune."
Given the importance of the financial services industries to the U.S.
economy, one priority of antitrust policy should be promoting the efficiency and competitiveness of the U.S. financial markets. In the past
decade, the Department ofJustice (DOJ) annually reviewed hundreds, if

16 For

an account of this shift and its implications, see KEVIN
FAILED POLITICS, AND THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF

RECKLESS FINANCE,

PHILLIPS,
AMERICAN

BAD

MONEY.

CAPITALISM

(2008).
17 See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Gross-Domestic-Product(GDP)-by-Industry Data, 1998-2009 NAICS Data and NAICS Data: 1947-97 GDPbyIndVANAICS, available at http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind-data.htm.
8
John C. Bogle, founder of The Vanguard Group, Commencement Address to the
MBA Graduates of the Georgetown University McDonough School of Business (May 18,
2007), http://www.johnboglemedia.com/books/l1john-bogle-enough.html; see also Ron
Chernow, The Lost Tycoons, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at 12 (Week in Review) ("Beneath
the razzle-dazzle of trading desks and the esoteric finance lay the inescapable fact that
these [Wall Street] firms had shed their original reason for being: providing capital to
U.S. business.").
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not thousands, of bank mergers.' 9 The 1990s, one DOJ official said at
the time, witnessed "an explosion both in the number of mergers in
banking and, in the past few years [late 1990s], in large deals that have
caught the public imagination and concern. " 20 The recent economic crisis involved "emergency" mergers in the banking sector. 2' During the
crisis, the U.S. antitrust and banking authorities, Shelanski observes,
greatly streamlined and expedited their bank merger reviews, such as in
the Wells Fargo/Wachovia and PNC/National City mergers.
But what was the DOJ's Antitrust Division reviewing in these bank
mega-mergers?. Antitrust enforcers typically examine a merger's anticompetitive risks with respect to the exercise of market power (ability
to raise price) in narrowly defined markets. So, absent the resurrection
of the perceived potential entrant theory, the DOJ would be unlikely to
challenge a merger between a dominant bank in the western United
22
States and a dominant bank in the eastern United States.
But in focusing on the short-term static effects (such as whether the
banks post-merger may raise rates for specific categories of borrowers),
antitrust enforcers can fail to see or assess the long-term impact of major
factors, such as the merger's impact on the efficiency, competitiveness,
and stability of the overall financial system.

19Comments by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on the Federal Reserve
Bank's Interpretive and Compliance Guide to the Anti-Tying Restrictions of Section 106
of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Docket No. R-1159 (Nov. 7,
2003) (noting that as part of its responsibilities to promote free competition, the Antitrust
Division reviews all applications for bank mergers and reports on the competitive factors
to either the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or the Office of Thrift Supervision), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/201459.pdf. Between its fiscal years 2000
and 2009, the DOJ participated annually in 463 (2009) to 1373 (2000) bank merger proceedings, with screenings requiring competitive analysis ranging between 342 and 945
mergers. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Antitrust Division Workload Statistics FY 2000-2009, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workstats.pdf.
20Robert Kramer, Chief, Litigation II Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
"Mega-Mergers" in the Banking Industry (Apr. 14, 1999), available at http://www.justice.
gov/atr/public/speeches/214845.pdf. See also Robert E. Litan, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen.,
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Assessment of Bank Mergers (Apr. 6, 1994)
(noting that in the early 1990s the DOJ was reviewing approximately 2000 bank merger or
acquisition applications per year), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/litan.htm.
21 During the crisis, the United States also made direct loans, equity investments, and
asset guarantees to numerous financial institutions.
22 See Kramer, supra note 20, at 7 (noting how the NationsBank and Bank of America
mega-merger "was a classic market extension merger since NationsBank's operations focused generally on the east coast and south and Bank of America was largely on the west
coast" so the merger's competitive issues for the DOJ involved only two states-New Mexico and Texas).
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One lesson from the financial crisis is the role of systemic risk. The
financial system, when viewed as a complex adaptive system, can become
more vulnerable when one bank increases in size and becomes too-bigto-fail. This is not always apparent. During periods of relative calm, having large financial institutions would appear beneficial. Even if a peripheral bank is subject to a random shock, the network's health would
remain stable. Indeed, the larger banks would be credited for absorbing
the shock. According to a Bank of England executive, "It is only when
the hub-a large or connected financial institution-is subject to stress
that network dynamics will be properly unearthed .... When large financial institutions came under stress during this crisis, these adverse
systemwide network dynamics revealed themselves."23
One mega-merger in the financial services industry during the 1990s
was the $70 billion merger of Travelers Group Inc. and Citicorp. In
1998, Travelers, a diversified financial services firm with total assets of
approximately $420 billion, engaged in various securities, insurance,
lending, advisory, and other financial activities in the United States and
overseas.2 4 Citicorp, with total assets of approximately $331 billion, was
the third-largest commercial bank in the United States. The merger created the largest commercial banking organization in the world, with total consolidated assets of approximately $751 billion.26 During its merger
review, a DOJ official said, the Antitrust Division "heard numerous complaints that Citigroup would have an undue aggregation of resourcesthat the deal would create a firm too big to be allowed to fail.' 26 But the DOJ
"essentially viewed this as primarily a regulatory issue to be considered
by the [Federal Reserve Board]."27
The Federal Reserve Board, however, dismissed this and several other
concerns, which presaged the financial crisis a decade later. Some commenters, summarized the Federal Reserve Board, warned that "Travelers's marketing and sales practices for its subprime mortgage loans,
personal loans and insurance products adversely affect consumers" and
the merger "would provide incentives for Citigroup to 'steer' [low to
23 Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Financial Stability, Bank of England, Rethinking the
Financial Network, Speech Delivered at the Financial Student Ass'n 11 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf.
24 Federal Reserve Board, Travelers Group, Inc. and Citicorp, Order Approving Formation of a Bank Holding Company and Notice to Engage in Nonbanking Activities, 84 FED.
RES. BULL. 985 (Sept. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Fed. Reserve Citicorp Order], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/BHC/1998/19980923/19980923.pdf.
25
Id., supra note 24, at 4.
2
6 Kramer, supra note 20 (emphasis added).
27Id.
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moderate income] and minority consumers to its subprime lenders."2 A
"significant number of other commenters" said the merger violated the
Glass-Steagall Act and "urged the Board not to consider the proposal
unless and until Congress amends the law to allow unlimited combinations of insurance, banking and securities businesses." 29 Commenters
also warned that the merger "would result in an undue concentration of
resources and in an organization that is both 'too big to fail' and 'too
30
big to supervise"'
In permitting the merger, the Federal Reserve responded that the
markets in which the merging parties competed were "unconcentrated"
and, in any market where one party had a significant presence, the
other party has a relatively small market share?3 The nation's largest
28 Fed. Reserve Citicorp Order, supra note 24, at 6. In 2002 in the largest consumer
protection settlement in FTC history,. Citigroup Inc. paid $215 million to resolve the
FTC's charges of systematic and widespread deceptive and abusive lending practices by a
company it acquired in 2000 and merged in its consumer finance operations. The FTC
sued Citigroup Inc. and CitiFinancial Credit Company as successor corporations to Associates First Capital Corporation and Associates Corporation of North America, which Citigroup acquired in 2000. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Citigroup Settles FTC
Charges Against the Associates Record-Setting $215 Million for Subprime Lending Victims (Sept. 19, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/09/associates.shtm. Citigroup said that the alleged predatory lending practices happened before its 2000
acquisition and that it had taken corrective steps to prevent such abusive tactics. See Citigroup Pays $215 in FTC Settlement, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct. 1, 2002, http://www.allbusi
ness.com/finance/304071-1.html. Despite these assurances, Citicorp and CitiFinancial
Credit Company were fined $70 million in 2004 for their subprime lending practices in
2000 and 2001. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, In the Matter of Citigroup, Inc., Order to Cease and Desist and Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued Upon Consent (May 27, 2004), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
press/enforcement/2004/20040527/attachment.pdf. And in 2005, Citigroup acknowledged that it made hundreds of high-cost home loans to customers with poor credit histories in 2004. Eric Dash, Citigroup Units Kept Making Loans that Violated Policy, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 4, 2005, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/04/business/O41oan.html?ref
=citigroup-inc.
2 Fed. Reserve Citicorp Order, supra note 24, at 6. Travelers CEO Sanford Weill had
hoped his mega-merger would push Congress to remove the barriers under the GlassSteagall Act. The NewsHour with fim Lehrer: FinancialPowerhouse (PBS television broadcast
Apr. 7, 1998) (transcript), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/anjune98/merger_-4-7.html. Congress did so a year later with the Gramm-Leach-Bilely Act of
1999. The 1999 law repealed the Glass-Steagall Act's restrictions on bank and securitiesfirm affiliations and amended the Bank Holding Company Act to permit affiliations
among financial services companies, including banks, securities firms, and insurance
companies. Glass-Steagall Act (1933), N.Y. TIMES, available at http://topics.nytimes.com/
topics/ reference/ timestopics/subjects/g/glasssteagall act_1933/ index.html.
30 Fed. Reserve Citicorp Order, supra note 24, at 74.
31 The nonbank subsidiaries of Travelers and Citicorp competed in underwriting and
dealing activities involving U.S. government, municipal government, asset backed, and
corporate debt and equity securities; investment advisory activities, including providing
advice on mergers, acquisitions, and corporate finance; securities brokerage activities; asset management activities; brokerage of shares of mutual funds and related advisory activi-

ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 77

corporate merger, predicted the Federal Reserve, "would have a de
minimis effect on competition."32 The Federal Reserve rejected the argument that the absolute or relative size of Citicorp would adversely affect the market structure. 3 It saw no evidence that "the size or breadth
of Citicorp's activities would allow it to distort or dominate any relevant
market." Finally, the Federal Reserve claimed it had "extensive experience supervising Citicorp and, building on that experience," it "developed a comprehensive, risk-based supervision plan" to effectively
monitor Citibank; also other agencies, like the Securities and Exchange
Commission, would "assist the Board in understanding Citigroup's busi5
ness and the risk profiles of those businesses."
Thus, during the 1990s, the DOJ and Federal Reserve Board heard
concerns about mega-mergers in the financial industry, including the
concern that the Citibank-Travelers merger would create an institution
too big to fail. Over the next decade Citigroup senior management (and
the Federal Reserve Board) demonstrated a lack of understanding of
the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) business and the risk profiles
of that business. 36 A decade later, Citibank, and other financial institutions considered too-big-to-fail, were (or were perceived to be) failing
and received an implicit government guarantee. Citigroup, an early recipient of the government bailout, received a $45 billion emergency infusion and $301 billion of government asset insurance, which was the
largest taxpayer bailout for any U.S. bank.37 In March 2010, Citigroup's
CEO testified before Congress that no financial institution should be
too-big-to-fail, and that "Citi owes a large debt of gratitude to American
38
taxpayers" for bailing out his bank.
ties; credit card operations; mortgage origination and servicing activities; consumer
finance activities; syndicated lending activities; foreign exchange activities; financial data
processing activities; trust services; and certain types of insurance underwriting and brokerage activities. Id. at 75.
32Id.
33Id. at 85.
34Id. at 86.
35Id.
36
After Citigroup senior executives testified before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission investigators on the cause of Citigroup's 2008 bailout, the Commission's Chairman Phil Angelides said, "One thing that is striking is the extent to which senior
management either didn't know or didn't care to know about risks that ultimately helped
bring the institution to its knees." Bradley Keoun et al., Citigroup "Liquidity Puts" Draw
Scrutinyfrom Crisis Inquiry, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 13, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2010-04-13/citigroup-s-14-billion-liquidity-put-loss-is-focus-of-u-s-crisis-panel.html.
37See id.; Pro Publica Inc., Where Is the Money?: Eye on the Bailout, http://bailout.pro
publica.org/entities/96-citigroup.
3 Eric Dash, Panelists Question Citigroup's "Government Guarantee," N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/05/business/O5tarp.html.
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Few question today that regulators should assess systemwide risks.
Among the issues debated are who should assess these risks, what structural or behavioral measures should be used to preserve or improve the
network's robustness, and what role should the antitrust agencies have
in this review.
To improve the Federal Reserve's ability to identify and correct
problems in financial institutions, Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve, said in January 2010
that the Federal Reserve is expanding beyond an institution-by-institution supervisory approach to one that evaluates the financial system's
health and stability from a systemwide perspective:
Toward that end, we are supplementing reviews of individual firms
with comparative evaluations across firms and with analyses of the interactions among firms and markets. We have further strengthened
our commitment to consumer protection. And we have strongly advocated financial regulatory reforms, such as the creation of a systemic
risk council, that will reorient the country's overall regulatory structure
toward a more systemic approach. The crisis has shown us that indicators such as leverage and liquidity must be evaluated from
a systemwide
39
perspective as well as at the level of individual firms.
Likewise, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act seeks to "promote the financial stability of the United
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 'too big to fail,' to protect the American taxpayer by ending
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices,
and for other purposes. '4 Toward that end, the Act created a Financial
Stability Oversight Council (Council), which, among other things, will
(1) monitor the financial services marketplace to identify potential
threats to the financial stability of the United States; and (2) advise Congress and make recommendations in such areas that will enhance the
integrity, efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the U.S. financial
markets.4'
Conspicuously missing from the Council are any officials from the
DOJ's Antitrust Division or the FTC. 42 It appears that antitrust is being
39Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble, Annual Meeting of the American Economic
Association 21 (Jan. 3, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20100103a.pdf.
40 Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (Dodd-Frank).
4112 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2).
4212 U.S.C. § 5321. The voting members of the Council are (a) the Secretary of the
U.S. Department of the Treasury, who also serves as the Council's Chairperson; (b) the
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marginalized. Despite the DOJ role in reviewing bank mergers and the
DOJ and FTC role in preserving the competitiveness of the U.S. financial markets, the agencies are on the sidelines with respect to this Council's fact-gathering and advising function.
For some, this may not be a concern. The expertise of the antitrust
agencies involves the exercise of market power in narrowly defined markets, not the integrity, efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the
U.S. financial markets overall. Antitrust enforcers do not continually
regulate market participants' behavior; instead they examine whether
particular actions (such as mergers) violate the federal antitrust laws.
The DOJ's antitrust review for bank mergers, for example, does not account for systemwide risks.4" Nor do the DOJ and FTC's merger guidelines address a merger's systemwide risks. 44 Antitrust enforcers
presumably have little knowledge about (and few tools to measure) systemwide risks. Even if the agencies had the tools, systemwide analysis
could add greater uncertainty to the merger process.
On the other hand, there are risks if antitrust policy ignores systemwide risks. Under a total welfare analysis, the competition authorities would not only assess a merger's short-term impact on consumer
and producer surplus, but also assess the tradeoff between the merger's
short-term productive efficiency gains and the longer-term risks (and
costs) posed by the merger, including its effect on the network's resilience. 45 The antitrust agencies' understanding of competition (and to
what extent a merger may substantially lessen competition) is not limited to price competition. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines make
clear that "[e]nhanced market power can also be manifested in nonprice terms and conditions that adversely affect customers, including reduced product quality, reduced product variety, reduced service, or diChairman of the Board of Governors; (c) the Comptroller of the Currency; (d) the Director of the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; (e) the Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission; (f)the Chairperson of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp6ration; (g) the Chairperson of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission;
(h) the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency; (i) the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board; and (j) an independent member appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, having insurance
expertise.
43U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Bank Merger Competitive Review-Introduction
and Overview (1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/6472.
htm.
4 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
(2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf; U.S. Dep't ofJustice
& Fed. Trade Comm'n, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm.
45Sally J. Goerner et al., Quantifying Economic Sustainability:ImplicationsforFree-Enterprise
Theory, Policy and Practice, 69 EcoLoccAL ECON. 76, 77 (2009).
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minished innovation." 46 Thus, in creating a financial institution too-bigto-fail, a merger can adversely affect consumers and other market participants by reducing the requisite degree of diversity for the financial
network to remain stable. Moreover, in being deemed too-big-to-fail, financial institutions can engage in risky behavior with the confidence of
a government bailout, and thus enjoy a competitive advantage over
47
smaller rivals that are permitted to fail.
The issue, then, is to what extent is antitrust analysis inadequate when
it ignores a merger's systemwide risks. The federal antitrust agencies
cannot assume that the Council or their sister agencies will engage in
this analysis adequately for the financial industry. The bank regulators
were ineffective in addressing the competitive implications of systemwide risk in the past two decades. Nor can the federal antitrust agencies assume that the Council will engage in this systemwide analysis for
every industry network. As Professor Darren Bush writes in this Symposium, the Congressional "whack-a-mole" regulation fails to prevent crises
in other network industries. 48 Thus, the competition authorities must be
knowledgeable about the systemwide risks from mergers across industries. Otherwise, the competition authorities will have little to say on this
important issue and risk being further marginalized. The competition
agencies, if ignorant of the systemwide risks that arise under their antitrust policies, also may be less effective advocates of competition policy
to their sister agencies, the states, and other countries.
Thus, competition authorities face the current dilemma. On the one
hand, merger policy currently does not offer the tools to intelligibly
make this risk assessment. On the other hand, to be effective competition advocates, the FTC and DOJ cannot ignore the systemwide risks
from a merger.
One way to end this dilemma is to amend the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act to
include at least one federal antitrust agency. The F-IC and DOJ should
also undertake more empirical work (or at least provide data for others
to review) that considers the requisite degree of diversity in a network to
withstand shocks as well as to foster innovation, employment growth,
and entry and the formation of new firms. 49 After engaging in such re46
47

Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 44, §1.0.
E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS,

JOSEPH

WORLD ECONOMY
48

AND THE SINKING OF THE

166 (2010).

Bush, supra note 14, at 278.

49The Amrican Antitrust Institute has been active in examining how complexity sci-

ence can inform antitrust analysis and systems-related issues. See, e.g.,

NETwORK ACCESS,
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST (THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS) (Diana L. Moss

ed. 2005) (compilation of work from AAI's Network Access Project); Gregory T. Gund-
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view, the antitrust agencies can advise on measures to maintain or restore the network's robustness. Rather than making systemwide risk
assessments merger-specific, the competition authorities can play an important role in designing proper structural safeguards, such as limiting
50
the banks' ability to grow through mergers beyond a certain threshold.
Shelanski's article is refreshing in warning of the dangers in marginalizing antitrust and in focusing on the long-run effects from mergers,
including the broader range of dynamic effects. In extending his argument, I would argue that competition authorities, when looking beyond
mergers' short-term impact on static price or output competition, must
better understand mergers' potential long-run effects on the network's
health and stability.
II. WHAT PROMOTES INNOVATION?
Professors Hylton and Lin's article, Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and Changing Economic Conditions, also incorporates
dynamic efficiency considerations into the economic analysis of antitrust
enforcement. Their article addresses one well-known antitrust problem:
how to design the antitrust laws to encourage, or at least to avoid discouraging, incentives to invest in the creation and expansion of
markets.
Antitrust policy, Hylton and Lin note, gives little attention to this dynamic efficiency problem. Few would dispute their observation. One
complaint is that antitrust policymakers over the past thirty years recognize the importance of dynamic competition for a country's long-term

lach & Albert A. Foer, Complexity, Networks, and the Modernization of Antitrust: The American
Antitrust Institute's Roundtable on the Science of Complexity and Antitrust, 51 ANTITRUST BULL.
1, 2 (2006) ("Incorporating insights and relying on metaphors from population ecology,
evolutionary biology, systems theory, chaos and the study of networks, the science of complexity attempts to describe and explain how systems and their occupants, including industries and firms, evolve and compete against one another over time through
adaptation, co-evolution and other dynamic processes."); AAI Systems Competition Invitational Symposium (June 17, 2009), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/systemscompetition-invitational-symposium. Other AAI symposia that discussed "complexity" of
the marketplace and its various manifestations, including "systems" and "systems competition," are: (a) Combining Horizontal and Vertical Analysis in Antitrust (2004); (b) Complexity, Networks and the Modernization of Antitrust (2005); (c) The Future of
Aftermarkets in Systems Competition (2006); and (d) Buyer Power (2007). The papers
presented in these symposia are available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/
ATBulletin.Papers.ashx.
5 Stephen Bartholomeusz, Britain's Banks on Notice, Bus. SPECTATOR, June 18, 2010,
http://www.businessspectator.com.ai/bs.nsf/Article/Volker-regulation-George-OsborneBank-of-England-F-pd20100617-6H5BG?OpenDocument&src=sph.
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economic growth, 5' but antitrust law has ossified around static price
competition. 2 Antitrust enforcement, FTC Commissioner J. Thomas
Rosch observed, "has historically focused more on static than dynamic
53
analysis."
Hylton and Lin propose a dynamic enforcement model to determine
the optimal level of fines to deter abuses by monopolists while not chilling dynamic efficiency. Hylton and Lin raise many points, but I will focus my comments on three important issues their model raises: (1)
What is the probability of successful enforcement of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act?; (2) What is the harm from monopolistic conduct?; and
(3) What is the necessary inducement for innovation?
A.

WHAT Is THE PROBABILTY OF SUCCESSFUL ENFORCEMENT OF

SECTION

2

OF THE SHERMAN ACT?

The authors' model is a variation of Gary Becker's decision regarding
whether to park illegally on the street rather than in a parking lot. The
Nobel Prize-winning economist thought about optimal deterrence theory in the 1960s after driving to Columbia University for an oral examination of a student in economic theory. Becker was late and had to
decide quickly whether to put the car in a parking lot or risk getting a
ticket for parking illegally on the street. He calculated the likelihood of
getting a ticket, the size of the penalty, and the cost of putting the car in

51Thomas 0. Barnett, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Competition Enforcement in an Innovative Economy, Address at the 4th Annual Competition
Policy Conference on the Role of Competition and Liberalization in Furthering Competitiveness (June 20, 2008) (discussing how dynamic efficiencies were critical in promoting
economic growth between 1909 and 1949; whereas gains from labor and capital intensity
accounted for one-eighth of U.S. GNP growth, "technical change" accounted for the remainder) (quoting Robert M. Solow, Growth Theory and After, Prize Lecture for the
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1987 (Dec. 8,
1987), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1987/so
low-lecture.html).
52Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: A Productivity-BasedApproach, in UNIQUE
VALUE: COMPETITION BASED ON INNOVATION: CREATING UNIQUE VALUE FOR ANTITRUST,

THE ECONOMY, EDUCATION AND BEYOND 154, 157 (Charles D. Weller ed., 2004) ("While
protecting short-run consumer welfare measured by price-cost margins is... important,
... productivity growth through innovation, where innovation is defined broadly to include not only products, but also processes and methods of management . .. [are] the
single most important determinant of long-term consumer welfare and a nation's stan-

dard of living.").
53J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Promoting Innovation: Just How
"Dynamic" Should Antitrust Law Be?, Remarks Before the USC Gould School of Law 2010
Intellectual Property Institute (Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
rosch/100323uscremarks.pdf.
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a lot, and decided it paid to take the risk and park on the street. (He did
54
not get a ticket.)
To achieve optimal deterrence, the total penalty (which includes civil
damages and criminal penalties) levied against a violator should equal
the violation's expected net harm to others (plus enforcement costs per
case) divided by the probability of detection and successful prosecution.5 5 So, for example, if the net harm is $900, the enforcement costs
are $100 and the probability of successful prosecution is 50 percent, the
optimal penalty would be $2,000.
Optimal deterrence theory assumes that rational profit-maximizing
monopolists make this calculation before engaging in the anticompetitive conduct. So Intel, for example, would have determined before (or
continually calculating during) its decade-long campaign of allegedly illegal and deceptive conduct the likely net harm from its conduct and
the probability of its conduct being successfully prosecuted. Assuming
that market participants behave that way, 6 under optimal deterrence
theory one must then accurately assess the probability of successful prosecution. Calculating the probability is not a concern if the probability is
known ex ante and remains constant (for example, if the probability of
Becker getting and having to pay a parking ticket was 30 percent). But
calculating the probability is a concern when the probability can vary, is
unknown ex ante, is subjective, or is difficult to determine and subject to
error.
Hylton and Lin recognize the real-world difficulties in calculating the
probability of successful prosecution of cartels, which hide their socially
unproductive collusion from the public. But they say that enforcers and
the courts would not face these difficulties for monopolization claims
because the probability of successful enforcement is high. The authors
contend that monopolization "generally is not difficult to detect" and
the "most common monopolizing acts (e.g., exclusive dealing, tying,
54 Gary

S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. POL.
385, 389-90 (1993); see also Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (discussing how society can conserve enforcement
resources and reduce the probability of detection by increasing the magnitude of sanctions); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctionsfor Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI.L. REv. 652,
656, 666-68 (1983).
55 Landes, supra note 54, at 657.
561 discuss several shortcomings of optimal deterrence theory, including its assumption
of rational actors, in Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
443, 475-88; Maurice E. Stucke, Am I a Price-Fixer?A BehavioralEconomics Analysis of Cartels,
in CRIMINALISING CARTELS: A CRITICAL INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF AN INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY MOVEMENT (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., forthcoming 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535720.
ECON.

2010]

LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRisis

mergers, cutting price below cost) are carried out in broad daylight and
even trumpeted to the public."57 In assuming that the probability of punishment for monopolistic offenses is greater than 33 percent, Hylton
and Lin conclude that antitrust law's treble damages are "probably ex'58
cessive for the typical monopolization case.
A high probability of successful prosecution under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act implies several things. First, it assumes that the legal standards under Section 2 are well recognized and easily implemented. The
Hylton-Lin model assumes that courts are "perfectly accurate." 59 But any
Section 2 analysis involves market power issues, which the authors recognize involve "a complicated assessment of facts and the exercise of discretion, especially with respect to burdens of proof. '60 Next the
generalist court must assess whether the monopolist's conduct violates
Section 2, often under a rule-of-reason legal standard, which has been
criticized for its poor administrability, the inconsistency of its results, the
degree of subjective input from the decisionmakers, its lack of transparency, and its higher risk of false positives and negatives. 61
Second, the empirical evidence does not support the assumption of a
high probability of successful enforcement of Section 2. The DOJ, for
example, did not litigate any Section 2 cases during the eight years of
the recent Bush administration. Private antitrust plaintiffs have had little
success in prevailing in Section 2 cases. In cases where courts address
the merits, private antitrust plaintiffs nearly always lose. 62 The statistics
can be biased, however. Antitrust plaintiffs with meritorious claims settle, leaving the questionable claims to go to trial and eventually be dismissed. But why would private plaintiffs (and their attorneys working for
contingency fees) invest the time and money to litigate frivolous cases?
Some antitrust plaintiffs perhaps invest in Section 2 litigation for competitive reasons, but one cannot assume all do. Hylton and Lin recognize that once judicial error and baseless or frivolous actions are
incorporated, optimal deterrence theory loses appeal.
Third, Hylton and Lin's argument is logically inconsistent. If the legal
standards under Section 2 were clear and predictably enforced, and the
probability of successful enforcement was high, why would any monopo57Hylton & Lin, supra note 13, at 253 (citation omitted).
58Id.
59Id. at 254.

60Id. at 264.
61
Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C.
REv. 1375, 1382 n.24 (2009) [hereinafter Rule of Reason] (collecting criticisms).
62 Id. at 1423-24.
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list trumpet its illegal conduct to the public? If monopolists were rational profit-maximizers, as optimal deterrence theory assumes, they
would not trumpet their illegal anticompetitive conduct, unless the benefits in doing so outweighed the likely costs, including the government
sanctions and treble private antitrust damages. If monopolists trumpet
their illegal conduct, as Hylton and Lin suggest, and the harm from the
monopolistic conduct exceeds the benefits to the monopolist, then
under optimal deterrence theory, the current antitrust penalties are insufficient and should be increased, rather than decreased.
Finally, Hylton and Lin's point is perhaps true for conduct that would
be lawful if undertaken by firms without monopoly power or for firms
that somehow remain unaware of their monopoly power. But monopoly
violations often involve business torts63 and deceptive conduct.64 For example, several notable cases-the DOJ's Section 2 case against
Microsoft 65 and FTC's allegations under Section 5 against Rambus 66 and
more recently Intel67-involved deception.
In reality, courts and enforcers cannot assume that the probability of
successful enforcement, a key variable under optimal deterrence theory,
is uniform, high, and constant for all monopolistic abuses. Determining
63 The FTC survey of private Section 2 claims decided between January 2000 and July
2007 identified "Business Torts" and "Walker Process claims" as the third and fourth most
popular theories of liability (following "Other" and "Refusals to Deal With Non-Rivals"
categories). William F. Adkinson, Jr. et al., Enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Theory
and Practice: Appendix: Methodology for the Studies of State and Private Section 2 Enforcement
Actions (FTC Working Paper, 2008), http://ftc.gov/os/sectiontwohearings/docs/secion
2overview.pdf.
64 For examples of a monopolist's anticompetitive deception, see Maurice E. Stucke,
How Do (and Should) Competition Authorities Treat a Dominant Firm's Deception?, 63 SMU L.
REV. 1069 (2010); Maurice E. Stucke, When a Monopolist Deceives, 76 ANTTRUST L.J. 823
(2010).
65 Microsoft publicly agreed to promote Java's cross-platform technologies and cooperate with Sun and lured independent software developers to use Microsoft's software development tools in designing Java applications. Based on Microsoft's representations, the
independent software vendors thought Microsoft's tools were for cross-platform applications and thus could be used on any computer with Java technology, not just computers
with Microsoft's operating systems. Unbeknownst to the vendors, Microsoft's tools included certain keywords and compiler directives that only Microsoft's version of Java
could execute properly. Thus, the deceived Java developers ended up producing applications that ran only on Microsoft's Windows operating system. United States v. Microsoft,
253 F.3d 34, 76-77 (2001).
66 Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (setting aside FTC's order challenging defendant's deception of standard-setting organization).
67 See, e.g., Intel Complaint, supra note 15, at 10 (alleging that "Intel engaged in deceptive
acts and practices that misled consumers and the public," such as failing to disclose material information about the effects of its redesigned compiler on the performance of nonIntel CPUs and misrepresenting that industry benchmarks reflected the performance of
its CPUs relative to its competitors' products); id. at 65-66 (deceptive advertising).
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the probability of successful enforcement will often be a complicated,
empirically driven endeavor, especially as monopolists seek to avoid detection by hiding their behavior. This complexity raises rule-of-law concerns when companies cannot accurately assess ex ante their likely
exposure to antitrust damages, and the litigants differ over the likelihood of successful prosecution.
B.

WHAT IS THE HARM FROM MONOPOLISTIC CONDUCT?

To assess the optimal penalty, the antitrust judge or enforcer must
next accurately calculate the net harm from the monopolist's challenged conduct.
Hylton and Lin propose a dynamic enforcement model, but their conception of harm from monopolistic behavior is static. Under their
model's worst-case scenario (i.e., the change in antitrust penalty would
have no effect on the firm's ex ante investment to innovate), the net
harm from the monopolistic conduct in a dynamic industry equals the
net harm under the Chicago School's static equilibrium model: namely,
the wealth transfer (from the price overcharge) from the consumer to
the monopolist (represented by the rectangle T in their graph) and the
welfare deadweight loss (represented by triangle D)."
But can one confidenly and accurately state that the net harm from
Intel's or Microsoft's anticompetitive monopolistic conduct over the
years was limited to only higher prices paid by consumers and the deadweight welfare loss? To assess harm under a dynamic enforcement
model for dynamic industries, one must also measure dynamic, not
static, harm, which includes the net loss of productive and dynamic efficiencies from the monopolistic conduct and any other economic, political, and social harms. 69
As Professor Shelanski points out, mergers in dynamic industries can
put at risk the substantial, long-run gains to consumer welfare from in-

68Hylton and Lin cite Landes's 1983 article on the static optimal penalty but their
model deviates from his in one important aspect-namely, whether enforcements costs
are multiplied by the probability of successful prosecution. This can play an important
role as enforcement costs increase in size-and as the probability of successful prosecution
decreases. For example, suppose plaintiffs enforcement costs are $5 million and
probability of successful prosecution is 20 percent. Under Hylton and Lin's model, the
monopolist pays $5 million (plus the multiplied net harm). Under Landes's model, upon
which Hylton and Lin rely, the monopolist pays $25 million (plus the multiplied net
harm). Landes, supra note 54, at 657.
69See Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?,2009 U. ILL. L. Rv.
497, 504-29 [hereinafter Monopolies] (discussing the economic, political, social and ethical concerns of a monopoly).
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novation. 70 Likewise, in complex adaptive systems, monopolistic conduct
over the long term can adversely impact innovation, productivity, and
society.71 A monopolist's anticompetitive behavior can reduce potential
entrants' incentives to compete and innovate in the affected industry.
Thus, a monopolist's impact on innovation can far outweigh any dead72
weight welfare losses or static pricing effects.
Ultimately the Hylton-Lin model specifically, and optimal deterrence
theory generally, requires one to assess accurately the net harm from the
violation. This may be easy for some offenses, such as a parking violation
or running over a neighbor's mailbox. But assessing the net harm
caused by a monopolist, especially in dynamic industries, can be difficult. The actual harm from monopolist conduct, at times, may be limited to the wealth transfer from supracompetitive prices and the
deadweight welfare loss, as Hylton and Lin assume. But monopolies can
inflict far greater harm. If one includes only some of the harm from the
violation, then under optimal deterrence theory, the resulting fine will
be too low, the monopolist will not be deterred, and society will bear the
cost.
C. WHAT IS THE NECESSARY INDUCEMENT FOR INNOVATION?

In their model, Hylton and Lin introduce a weighting parameter 0
(itself a function of the penalty), which varies with the relative responsiveness of the firm's monopolization and investment incentives to
changes in the penalty. Hylton and Lin do not address how enforcers
and courts will reliably and accurately calculate this weighting parameter. The key question under the Hylton-Lin model is whether the firm
would invest in socially beneficial innovation absent the monopolizing
conduct. Consequently, calculating the weighting parameter raises several issues for enforcers and courts.
One issue is whether monopoly profits were necessary to induce innovation. For example, the Supreme Court in Trinko surmised-for the

70 Shelanski,

supra note 12.

71 Sanghoon Ahn, Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: A Review of Theory

& Evidence 5 (OECD Econ. Dep't Working Paper No. 317, 2002) (noting that
"[c]ompetition has pervasive and long-lasting effects on economic performance by affecting economic actors' incentive structure by encouraging their innovative activities, and
selecting more efficient [activities]"), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/182144868
160.
72 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.
ECON. REv. 18 (1968) (must assess (i) the cost from slower (or the lack of) technological
progress once a monopolist lays claims to a national market, and (ii) the other social costs
imposed (or incurred) by the monopolist or cartel, such as the political implications of
control over wealth, which are a matter for serious concern).
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first time in its opinions-that charging monopoly prices is "an important element of the free-market system," and that monopoly pricing
serves as an inducement to "attract[ ] 'business acumen' in the first
place" and engage in "risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth."73 The Court's assumption that the prospect of monopoly
profits is necessary for innovation to occur is empirically suspect. 4 The
difficulty lies in predicting where and when this innovation will emerge
and what motivates this innovation. An evolutionary outlook, for example, assumes that companies take risks and innovate to survive.7 5 Even
without the prospect of monopoly profits, companies enter markets and
innovate.7 6 Although participants in some industries, such as pharmaceuticals, incur significant R&D expenses with the expectation of patent
protection for their innovation and any ensuing monopoly rents, the
empirical evidence does not support any general conclusion that monopolies (or the prospect of monopoly rents) are necessary for
innovation.
In a Business Week/Boston Consulting Group survey, for example,
2500 senior executives from fifty-eight countries and all major industries
identified their company's risk-averse culture as the major obstacle to
innovation. These executives cited customer satisfaction as the top metric to measure innovation success followed by revenue growth. Fewer
than 40 percent cited higher margins, which the Court in Trinko
surmised was the inducement for innovation. 7
73

Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
74See, e.g., Stucke, Monopolies, supra note 69, at 504-20 (collecting literature).
75See, e.g.,
ThomasJ. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of
the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology andEthics to Structuraland Behavioral Antitrust Analyses, Loy. U. CI. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (an evolutionary biology perspective on why large economic concentrations, such as monopolies and oligopolies, are
vastly overrated in terms of their overall efficiency and positive impacts on our economic
system, and how the Chicago School underrates their dangerous impacts), available at
http://works.bepress.com/thomas-horton/1.
76 For example, in 2008, an average of 0.32 percent of the adult population (320 of
100,000 adults) created a new business each month, representing approximately 530,000

new businesses per month.

ROBERT

W. FAIRLIE,

KAUFFMAN INDEX OF ENTREPRENEURIAL

AC-

1996-2008, at 2 (2009), available at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/
kiea_042709.pdf. These businesses were further categorized by their potential to produce
high, medium, and low-income levels for the entrepreneur. In 2008, more new businesses
were created each month in low-income-potential types of businesses (130 new businesses
created each month per 100,000 people), than in either medium-income-potential types
of businesses (123 new businesses per 100,000) or high-income-potential types of businesses (69 new businesses). Id. at 6.
77Jena McGregor, Innovation Insights: Key Findings of Our Annual Survey of Senior Executives, Bus. WK., May 3, 2007, http://images.businessweek.com/ss/07/05/050 3 -inno_
rankings/source/6.htm.
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Even if monopoly profits were needed for innovation to reach the
market, a second issue is whether a monopolist could protect this innovation by using less anticompetitive or otherwise legal measures, such as
advertising, to foster brand loyalty. By being the first mover, a company
can maintain its market position through reputation effects, slow infor8
mation diffusion, and regulatory or other entry barriers.1
Even if (i) monopoly profits were needed for innovation to reach the
market and (ii) the monopolist could not protect this innovation
through less anticompetitive or otherwise legal measures, a third issue is
whether the enforcer and court can effectively limit the supracompetitive monopoly profits to the minimum amount necessary for the firm to
invest in the innovation. No one contends that the monopolist's reward
be unlimited to spur innovation. Hylton and Lin state that the otherwise
illegal exclusionary behavior should last only long enough for the innovating firm to earn a sufficient return on its investment.7 9 This raises
complications. Antitrust plaintiffs may dispute the proper return on investment (arguing for a smaller amount). Courts and enforcers may not
know when the monopolist exceeded its return on investment, which
raises the risk that the monopolist continues to engage in anticompetitive behavior after earning its return. Finally, a monopolist because of
network effects may no longer need to rely on exclusionary behavior to
secure its monopoly profits.
Even if (i) monopoly profits were needed for innovation to reach the
market, (ii) the monopolist could not protect this innovation through
less anticompetitive or otherwise legal measures, and (iii) the enforcer
and court could effectively limit the supracompetitive monopoly profit
to the minimum amount necessary to the investment in the innovation,
a fourth issue is whether, and to what extent, the innovation benefits
society. Innovation is not an end in itself, but the means of promoting
overall welfare; it inherently involves trade-offs. With intellectual property, the reward to its owner is a secondary consideration to the general
benefits that the public derives from the innovation." Ironically, as it
78

Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Economics of Ideas and IntellectualProperty, 102

PROC. NAT'L AcA.D.
79 Hylton & Lin,
80 H.R. REP. No.

Sci. U.S. 1252, 1254 (2005).

supra note 13, at 267, 272.
60-2222, at 7 (1909) (enacting the copyright law, Congress considered
"how much the monopoly granted [would] be detrimental to the public ... [as] the
granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly."); see also Pfaff v.
Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) ("The balance between the interest in motivating
innovation and enlightenment by rewarding invention with patent protection on the one
hand, and the interest in avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition on
the other, has been a feature of the federal patent laws since their inception.").
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relates to the financial crisis, J.P. Morgan innovated with new forms of
credit default swaps precisely because competing investment banks cop8
ied prior financial innovations and industry margins were eradicated. '
The fact that this copying occurred did not preventJ.P. Morgan and the
other investment banks from innovating with new financial products
that led to a global financial crisis.
Nonetheless the Hylton-Lin model could serve several important purposes. First, it may help explain why generalist courts are reluctant to
impose antitrust liability on companies that create a new market
through their innovation and whose conduct would be legal if engaged
in by firms without market power. Second, although many recognize
that competition from new commodities, technologies, sources of supply, and organizational structures can be more important than static
price competition, the authors seek to develop a model that promotes
(or at least does not deter) the incentive to innovate. Third, this issue
will be of importance when private antitrust enforcement takes hold in
the European Union and elsewhere. 82
III. WHAT ARE THE GOALS OF ANTITRUST LAW?
Professor Bush's article, Too Big to Bail: The Role of Antitrust in Distressed
Industries, raises the political implications of concentrated economic
power. In the tradition of Robert Pitofsky's seminal article 83 (which appeared with Richard Posner's famous piece on the Chicago School),84
Bush addresses the goals of competition law. He notes how antitrust policy over the past thirty years has ignored issues once considered important, such as the political and economic effects of firm size on the
economy as a whole. Bush raises several historical and salient concerns
about monopolies, such as (1) their political influence; (2) the effect of
their size on the economy; and (3) their effect on distribution of income. Although Bush's first two historical concerns are recognized antitrust concerns, some may ask, "What does income inequality have to do
with antitrust?"

81 GILLIAN TETT, FOOL'S GOLD:

How

THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MOR-

GAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE

(2009).

European Comm'n, Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules,
COM (2005) 672 final (Dec. 19, 2005), availableat http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0672:FIN:EN:PDF.
83 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979).
84 Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 933
(1979).
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As many scholars have documented, the pattern of income disparity
between the 1920s and mid-2000s has a distinctive "U" shape. 85 Despite
increases in worker productivity, income inequality has grown in the
United States, beginning in the late 1970s and increasing after Ronald
Reagan took office in 1981.86 Although the disparity between the rich
and poor has widened globally, the OECD observed, "nowhere has this
trend been so stark as in the United States."87 Despite its high employment rate, the United States in 2005 had the third-highest poverty rate
and third-highest income gap between the rich and poor among OECD
nations (trailing Mexico and Turkey on both measures).88 The United
States also ranks lower among OECD nations for earnings mobility between generations. 89 In other words, contrary to the Horatio Alger belief,90 the poor in the United States are likely to produce the next
generation of poor.
85 LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2008/2009 Fig. 1K (2009)
(examining share of total income held by top 1 percent of households), available at
http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/tabfig/2008/01/19.pdf. After increasing in the
1920s, income inequality in the 1930s and 1940s declined, and the level was relatively
stable between the 1950s and 1970s, a period also known for its robust (and at times
possibly too robust) antitrust enforcement. In the 1970s, for example, the United States
was a rich country with an educated population, but its income inequality was not significantly greater than in other wealthy countries. Thomas Lemieux, For Equality, Education
Matters, SCIENCE, Sept. 26, 2008, at 1779. The Gini coefficient, based on equalized household disposable income, after taxes and transfers, ranges between 0 (perfect equality,
where each share of the population gets the same share of income) and 1 (perfect inequality, where all income goes to the individual with the highest income). In the United
States, the Gini coefficient in the mid-1970s was 0.32, and grew to 0.38 by the mid-2000s.
The Gini coefficient in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Sweden, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, and Norway remained at or below 0.30 during this period.
OECD, Income Distribution-Inequality(Table), http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSet
Code=INEQUALITY.
86 Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States: 1913-1998,
118 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2003). Professor Saez has updated their 2003 article's tables and figures
with federal income tax data up to 2008. See http://elsa.berkeley.edu/-saez/TabFig2008.
xls (July 2010); see also MISHEL ET AL., supra note 85, at Fig. 1K ("Data on income concentration going back to 1913 show that the top 1 percent of wage earners [in 2006] hold 23
percent of total income, the highest inequality level in any year on record, bar one: 1928."
Id. at 3, available at http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/swa08 00_execsum.pdf).
87 OECD, Country Note: United States, in GROWING UNEQUAL?: INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND
POVERTY IN OECD COUNTRIES 1 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/
2/41528678.pdf. Interestingly, the income divide between 1948 and 2007 trended upward
during Republican administrations and downward during Democratic administrations.
LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY- THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED
AGE UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY (2008).
88 OECD, Are We Growing Unequal? 2-3 (Oct. 2008), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
48/56/41494435.pdf.
89Id. at 7; see also MISHEL ET AL., supra note 85, at 5.
90See, e.g., Roland Bnabou &Jean Tirole, Belief in a Just World & Redistributive Politics,
Q.J. ECON. 699, 701-03 (2006) (noting popular perceptions of upward mobility in the
United States and Europe).
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The increasing income inequality in the United States over the past
thirty years raises many issues, including: (a) what causes income inequality, and is lax antitrust enforcement a contributing factor, and (b)
how does income inequality affect antitrust policy? The issue of income
inequality is itself complex, and its relationship to competition policy
adds further complexity. A full examination of these issues is beyond
this article's scope. Rather, the purpose here is to sketch these issues for
future research.
A.

WHAT CAUSES INCOME INEQUALITY, AND

Is

LAX ANTITRUST

ENFORCEMENT A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR?

Economists agree that income inequality is not attributable to one factor. As Professors Frank Levy and Peter Temin state, there is "no single
determinant, whether education, minimum wage, capital or labor mobility, that determines the path of income distribution." 91 Economists
disagree over the primary causes of income inequality. 92 To what extent
then is the level of antitrust enforcement a contributing factor to the
increasing income inequality?
One way in which antitrust policy can affect income inequality is via
mitigating wealth transfers to buyers and sellers with significant market
power. 91 For example, consumers may be paying supracompetitive overdraft fees to large financial institutions, which in turn distribute the

91 Frank S. Levy & Peter Temin, Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America 44
(MIT Dep't of Econ. Working Paper No. 07-17, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=984330.
92 Some cite as the primary causes technological change and the rising demand for skill
(referred to as skill-biased technical change (SBTC)). PAUL KRUC.MAN, THE CONSCIENCE
OF A LIBERAL 132 (2007) (discussing and criticizing SBTC position); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
THE CHANGING SHAPE OF THE NATION'S INCOME DISTRIBUTION 1947-1998, at 10 (June

2000). But other economists note the shortcomings of the SBTC proposition, including
the lack of direct supporting evidence; its inability to explain why median college-educated salaries for U.S. males increased in real dollars only 17 percent since 1973; and why
levels of income inequality have remained fairly stable in continental European countries
and Japan over the past thirty years. KRUGMAN, supra, at 132-41; Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historicaland InternationalPerspective, 96 Am.
ECON. REv. 200, 204 (2006); Piketty & Saez, supra note 86, at 31-35. Others attribute
changes in labor market institutions (including the decline of unions, minimum wages,
and progressive taxes) and social norms (social outrage over high salaries) as significantly
affecting income inequality. Levy & Temin, supra note 91, at 5.
93 See, e.g., Bush, supra note 14, at 287 (discussing SCP tenet that "concentrated market
structures lead to a redistribution-or perhaps a 'maldistribution'-of income").
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rents unequally (namely to the CEOs94 and other senior executives) .5
Among the goals of antitrust Professors Lawrence Sullivan and Warren
Grimes discuss is preventing such wealth transfers. 96 Congress "intended
to stop powerful firms from shifting wealth from consumers to themselves;" thus, "protecting consumer pocket books from market power
overcharges is probably at the core of political support for the antitrust
1aws." 97
One would expect markets, as they become more competitive, to disperse economic power and alleviate the resource allocation and income
distribution problem.98 Professors Levy and Temin, for example, calculated economic rents (the sum of compensation and corporate profits)
per full-time-equivalent (FTE) employee between 1950 and 2000 for several categories of industries. 99 They found that from 1950 through the
1970s, the economic rents per FIE employee in finance, insurance, and
real estate industry (aggregated) grew at a similar rate to the other surveyed industries. 100 But between the mid-1980s and 2000, economic rent
per FTE for the finance, insurance, and real estate industry grew at a
much higher rate to over $100,000, which was more than any other category and more than double the levels for the services and all private
industries categories. 10 1
A second way in which antitrust policy can affect income inequality is
in reinforcing other economic institutions and informal social norms
that affect income inequality. Runaway executive compensation, for
94Piketty & Saez, supra note 86, at 32-33 (Fig. XI) (showing how average CEO compensation between the early 1970s and 1999 increased at a much faster rate than the average
wage of a full-time U.S. worker).
95In 2009, consumers paid a record $38.5 billion in overdraft fees for their debit cards,
nearly double the amount reported in 2000. Saskia Scholtes & Francesco Guerrera, Banks
in $38.5bn Windfallfrom Fees, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, at 1. See also FDIC, FDIC STUDY OF
BANK OVERDRAFr PROGRAMS

18, 22 (Nov. 2008) (noting how large banks (assets greater

than $1 billion) tended to charge higher overdraft and usage fees than mid-size and small
banks (assets less than $250 million)), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/
overdraft/FDIC1 38.ReportFinal-v5O8.pdf.
96 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED
HANDBOOK 12-16 (2d ed., 2006); Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than
Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1193 (1977) (discussing bow efficiency and equity concerns, including the distribution of income are not mutually exclusive).
97 SULLIVAN
98

F.M.

FORMANCE

& GRIMES, supra note 96, at 13.

SCHERER

&

DAVID

Ross,

INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-

18-19 (3d ed. 1990).

99Levy & Temin, supra note 91, at 36-37 (surveying all private industries; services; finance, insurance and real estate; manufacturing; and retail trade and automobile
services).
lOOId. at 37.
101Id.
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some economists, is not simply'a function of supply and demand for the
executives' services, but is shaped by institutions and social norms, such
as the social attitudes of shareholders, workers, politicians, and the general public. 02 In discussing how the labor market institutions and social
norms affect income inequality, Professors Levy and Temin distinguish
between two time periods: the first was the "Treaty of Detroit" period,
which was after World War II to the late 1970s, where the income inequality levels in the United States were kept in check by labor laws,
unions, progressive taxes, high minimum wages, and social norms.
Thereafter, during the "Washington Consensus "period, these economic
institutions came under attack in the name of efficiency, which contributed to the steep rise in income inequality.0 3
Similarly, Professor Bush discusses how antitrust policy shifted over
this time period. Before Reagan and the Chicago School, most historical
approaches to antitrust, as Bush describes, considered the social, political, and distributional ramifications of firm size upon the economy and
distrusted the concentration of economic wealth. Despite the Sherman
Act's inconsistent enforcement over the past century, it had originally
embodied at least a competitive ideal of curbing the concentration of
economic power and serving as the last obstacle to complete industrial
autocracy. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, observed that
cartels and monopolies flourished in pre-war Germany because of the
absence of antitrust laws and a lack of popular distrust of the concentra04
tion of power and monopolies.
Antitrust policy's distrust of the concentration of economic power
changed with the Reagan administration and rise of the Chicago
School. 105 Concentration, even to the brink of monopoly, Bush writes,
was characterized as beneficial in terms of efficiency. As Bush observes,
"Political influence, the distribution of income, and the effect of firm
size on the economy as a whole and on the political process are now well
out of vogue." 106
For some (including within academia) there is the belief that the importance of antitrust in the United States diminished during the Reagan
administration and never recovered (despite the prosecutions of
supra note 92, at 145.
at 136-41; Levy & Temin, supra note 91.
104Wilhelm Cohnstaedt, Germany's Cartels and State Control:A Revealing Study of the Reich's
Post-War Industrial Monopoly Organizations, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1935, at BR9; John H.
Crider, Roosevelt Callsfor Cartels Curb: In Letter to Hull He Says Types of "Trusts" Used by Reich
Must Be Ended, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1944, at 1.
105 Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 61, at 1451-52.
106Bush, supra note 14, at 299.
102 KRUGMAN,
103 Id.
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Microsoft, 10 7 international cartels, 0 8 and Intel'0 9). Unlike in earlier presidential campaigns, antitrust policy is no longer mentioned, much less
debated, in recent elections. 110 In one 2003-04 survey, many younger
Americans (ages 18 to 29), unlike the older Americans surveyed, were
unconcerned about economic concentration.' Fifty-four percent of the
younger Americans were very or somewhat satisfied with the size and
influence of major corporations, which was fifteen percentage points
higher than the next-most-optimistic age group (30- to 49-year-olds),
and satisfaction with major corporations decreased even more among
the older age groups. Among the factors to explain this disparity, Gallup's chief economist identified the federal government not pursuing
monopolies the way it once did (therefore, younger people did not have
such a negative view of monopolies) and that the antitrust laws were not
emphasized in business school the way they once were." 2 While many
antitrust professionals followed the antitrust trial against Microsoft, few
average Americans apparently did."'
Thus, one issue to be further explored is to what extent, if any, did
the shift in competition policy and changes in social attitudes toward
monopolies over this time period contribute to the rise in income inequality. They may be contributing factors to the income inequality problem or may be simply a symptom of a larger trend toward reduced
government involvement in the marketplace, increased hostility to un-

107 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
108One example is the lysine cartel, United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir.
2000), featured in the film The Informant!, based on KURT EICHENWALO, THE INFORMANT
(2000).
109Intel Complaint, supra note 15.
110 For example, a search on the Commission on Presidential Debates Web site found
the term "antitrust" mentioned last in October 6, 1976, in the Second Carter-Ford Presidential Debate (Ford stating, "my administration-and I'm very proud of it-is the first
administration that has taken an antitrust action against companies in this country that
have allegedly cooperated with the Arab boycott"), http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=debate-transcripts; Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 61, at 1390-98 (discussing Wilson-Taft-Roosevelt debate over rule-of-reason standard).
"' Linda Lyons, Youthful Optimism? Young Americans Happy with "Big Business," GALLUP.
cOM (Mar. 2, 2004), http://www.gallup.com/poll/10816/Youthful-Optimism-YoungAmericans-Happy-Big-Business.aspx.
112

Id.

"13 The

Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Campaign Incidents Have Little
Punch (Dec. 16, 1999) (noting that only about one in ten people (11 percent) said they
followed reports of the antitrust trial against Microsoft, which was relatively unchanged
from interest in this story in November 1998), http://people-press.org/report/?pageid253.
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ions, reduction of taxes for the wealthy, spiraling individual and corpo14
rate debt, and greater market speculation.
B. How DOES INCOME INEQUALITY AFFECT ANTITRUST POLICY?

Even if one concludes that the shift in antitrust policy was not a contributing factor to the rise of income inequality, then to what extent
does economic concentration affect antitrust enforcement? Antitrust
policy was historically concerned about preventing the concentration of
economic power. But once economic power is concentrated, what then
is the role of antitrust?
Although the Sherman Act was enacted during a period of significant
income inequality, one risk with concentrated economic power is that
antitrust falls by the wayside. If antitrust policy principally seeks "to stem
the 'rising tide"' of economic concentration 1 15 and preserve "a competitive system [ ] seen as essential to avoid the concentration of economic
power that (is] thought to be a threat to the Nation's political and social
system,"116 then competition policy offers benefits to middle-class and
lower-income consumers and small-to-moderate-sized firms. The economically powerful may derive some benefit under this antitrust policy
(such as lower input costs), but the costs from vigorous antitrust enforcement may outweigh these benefits. If the fringe firm were an annoyance, the dominant firm may resort to quicker, lower-cost means to
resolve their disputes, such as partnering with the fringe firm to increase
mechanisms to punish unwanted behavior, or retaliating with anticompetitive measures.
Once power and wealth are concentrated, social policies are often directed to preserve the status quo.117 As Professor Bush observes, "Political power has the capacity to potentially translate into economic power,
for example by intensely lobbying for legislation that derails competition in the marketplace."" 8 Economic power also has the capacity to
114 PHILLIPS, supra note 16, at 71 (identifying ten recurring characteristics of the late
19th century Gilded Age, the Roaring Twenties, and the post-1982 Second Gilded Age).
See also Goerner et al., supra note 45, at 80 (criticizing the laissez-faire assumption that
highly skewed distributions of wealth, power, and size do not affect economic health).
115United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 552 (1966) (quoting United States
v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276 (1966) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962))).
116United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 541 (1973) (Douglas, J., con-

curring in part) (quoting
ARY,

92D

STAFF OF ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE H. COMM. ON THEJUDICICONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON H. RES. 161: INVESTIGATION OF CONGLOMERATE

CORPORATIONS 18 (Comm. Print)).
117Stucke, Monopolies, supra note 69, at 521-25 (providing examples).

118Bush, supra note 14, at 286.
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translate into political power. The wealthy can seek to redefine the goals
of antitrust policy to preserve their economic power, use the competition law to deter entry," 9 or direct antitrust enforcement against unions
(which happened early in the Sherman Act's history12 ° ) and other atomistic buyers and sellers who collectively bargain against the dominant
firm.
The relationship between competition policy and income inequality is
worthy of further evaluation. Bush's article is timely in raising these concerns. In 2007, many more Americans saw the United States divided into
the "haves" and "have-nots," with more classifying themselves as the
have-nots. 12' During the financial crisis, Americans were angry over the
wide wealth disparity. 2 2 Competitive markets should have the effect of
alleviating, not increasing, income inequality. Antitrust's populist principles, if nothing else, can serve as signposts of whether our competition
policies are indeed heading in the right direction.
IV. CONCLUSION
As Claude Bernard wrote, "Those who have excessive faith in their
ideas are not well fitted to make discoveries.' 23 Economic theory will
continue to shape antitrust policy. The most interesting issue will be the
evolution of economic theories relied on by antitrust enforcers, practitioners, and courts after the financial crisis. We have already seen the
shift in academic research toward more interdisciplinary economic approaches. The growth stocks in academia today are not the Chicago
School's or even post-Chicago School's "rational choice" theories, but in
119See, e.g., Citicorp v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 87 F.R.D. 43, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Citicorp
sought to block the entry of defendants into the market for U.S. dollar travelers checks,
alleging that defendants' plan to introduce checks bearing the trademark and logo
"Master Charge" violated the Sherman Act).
120The eighth federal antitrust action brought by the United States was against Eugene

V. Debs. CCH, THE

FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: WITH SUMMARY OF CASES INSTITUTED BY THE

UNITED STATES 1890-1951 69 (1952). The United States prosecuted numerous unions

and union officials. Id. at 459-60 (index of cases against unions); PAUL E. HADLICK, CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS UNDER SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT 140 (1939) (the first persons to serve
jail sentences resulting from Sherman Act violations were Eugene V. Debs and others,
growing out of the Pullman strike of 1894).
121Jodie T. Allen & Michael Dimock, A Nation of "Haves"and "Have-Nots"?FarMore Americans Now See Their Country as Sharply Divided Along Economic Lines, PEwRESEARCHCENTER.
ORG (Sept. 13, 2007), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/593/haves-have-nots.
122 John Thornhill, Poll Shows Wide Dislike of Wealth Gap, FTLcoM, May 18, 2008, http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/86c4edea-250f-1 dd-al4a000077b07658.html?nclickcheck=l;
David Frum, The Vanishing Republican Voter, N.Y. TIMES (Sunday Mag.), Sept. 7, 2008, at 50.
This displeasure over the wealth disparity exists in the European Union as well. John
Thornhill et al., Accent on Egalitd, FIN. TIMES, June 9, 2008, at 7.
123 KARL POPPER, POPPER SELECTIONS

84 (David Miller ed., 1985).
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such fields as behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. 124 A tension
exists between the Chicago School's and post-Chicago School's mathematical models, based on the faulty assumption of rational behavior,
and behavioral antitrust, which provides more realistic assumptions of
market behavior, which may not be as easily modeled.
Despite the protestations among rational choice proponents, competition policy will likely follow the interdisciplinary intellectual current.
The regulatory, intellectual, and moral failures of the past decade have
already prompted competition lawyers and economists in the United
States and European Union to reconsider the assumptions underlying
current competition policies, and whether such policies are indeed
achieving their desired goals. 125 But predicting the form of innovation in
antitrust policies that arise after the financial crisis is like predicting innovation generally. We know it is coming, but not necessarily when,
where, and by whom.

124FTC Commissioner Rosch, for example, identified as one agency priority "how to
incorporate behavioral economics principles into our enforcement decisions." J. Thomas
Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Enforcement Priorities in the New Administration,
Remarks at the Global Competition Review's 2009 Competition Law Review (Nov. 17,
2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/091117enforceprioritiesremarks.
pdf.
125See, e.g., Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 INDIANA L.J.
(forthcoming 2011) (discussing increasing interest in behavioral economics and its applications to competition law), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1582720.

